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DO SIDE PAYMENTS HELP? COLLECTIVE




I investigate when side payments facilitate cooperation in a context with strategic delegation.
Ontheonehand,allowingsidepaymentsmaybenecessarywhenoneparty’sparticipationcon-
straint otherwise would be violated. On the other, with side payments each principal appoints
a delegate that values the project less, because this increases her bargaining power. Reluctant
agents, in turn, implement too few projects. I show that side payments are bad if the hetero-
geneityissmallwhiletheuncertaintyandthetypicalvalueoftheprojectarelarge.Withalarger
number of parties there may be a stalemate without side payments, but delegation becomes
more strategic as well, and cooperation decreases in either case. (JEL: C78, D78, F53, H77)
1. Introduction
Dosidepaymentshelp?Collectivedecisionsarehardtoreachwhenanypartycan
veto the project, as soon as it is not beneﬁcial to that party. With side payments,
however, the winners of a collective project can compensate the losers, such that
they all beneﬁt by implementing it. In fact, it follows from Coase’s Theorem
(1960) that negotiations are efﬁcient in the absence of transaction costs. But in
politics, and in many other organizations, it is not the principal (she) herself that
negotiates the decision, but her representative or agent (he). A principal may thus
be tempted to appoint an agent that is more negative towards the project, because
he then has to be compensated by the other agents. When all principals delegate
strategically in this way, the agents end up rejecting projects that would have
beneﬁted their principals. For this reason, introducing side payments can make
cooperation less efﬁcient.
Thisarticleinvestigatesthistrade-offinaverysimplemodel.Intheﬁrststage,
the principals simultaneously choose the identities of their agents. Thereafter, the
agentsgettogethertonegotiatewhethertheprojectsshouldbeimplementedand,if
feasible,asetofsidetransfersbetweenthem. Whethersidepaymentsarefeasible
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or not, the project is in equilibrium rejected too often compared to the social
optimum. The reason is, for the case without side payments, that the winners are
unable to compensate the losers, no matter how small their losses are. For the
case with side payments, the reason is that each principal delegates to a reluctant
agent to gain bargaining power, and reluctant agents do not implement all good
projects. Side payments increase cooperation if and only if the net value of the
projectislikelytobelarge,theuncertaintyislarge,andtheheterogeneityissmall.
If the number of parties increases it may be more likely that at least one agent
needs compensation, but the principals appoint less enthusiastic agents as well.
It is thus unclear whether side payments are more desirable for large clubs, since
collective action is less likely either way.
The question of whether side payments should be used is relevant in many
contexts. In markets, the question is similar to whether one should deviate from
a benchmark (focal or pre-agreed) price. In domestic politics, transfers between
districts can be facilitated by tax rates that differ across districts, or by letting the
districts contribute unequally to regional public goods. For international nego-
tiations, side payments could be facilitated by linking one type of agreement
with another. Scholars have been puzzled by how seldom such transfers actu-
ally take place: tax rates are typically uniform across districts, and environmental
agreements are seldom linked to trade, for example.
Inmanycontexts,thefeasibilityofsidepaymentsdependsontheinstitutional
details. In the European Council, consisting of the heads of states and prime min-
isters, side transfers are possible because the negotiators have discretion over a
large set of policies. The Council of Ministers, on the other hand, consists of spe-
cialized ministers who have less discretion over other policies: side transfers may
thus be difﬁcult. The optimal allocation of control between these two chambers
may therefore hinge on whether side payments are good or bad, that is, on the
conditions derived below.
Side payments are, as noticed, typically presumed to be good for efﬁciency.1 Fn 1
This article emphasizes a cost associated with side transfers, and explains when
it may be beneﬁcial to leave transfers out of the negotiations. Because side pay-
mentscanbeinterpretedasissuelinkages,thearticlecontributestotheliterature2 Fn 2
on whether such linkages are good. Interpreting the side payments as policy dif-
ferentiation, the article explains why uniform policies often should exist.3 In a Fn 3
1. For example, Nugent (2003, p. 357) observes that “linking issues together in ‘package deals’
can open the door to agreements by ensuring that there are prizes for everybody,” and Cesar and de
Zeeuw (1996, p. 158) state that “side payments are needed to reach the best result.”
2. See, for example, Inderst (2000).
3. The ﬁscal federalism literature (see, e.g., Oates 1999) typically assumes that centralization
implies uniformity, although such harmonization is considered to be a drawback: Alesina, Angeloni,
and Etro (2005) criticize such harmonization and Hoel (1992) shows how it can reduce participation
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related paper, Harstad (2007a), I argue that side payments may increase delay
in bargaining when there is private information and this cost can outweigh the
“gains from trade” that side payments sometimes facilitate. The model herein is
different in three respects: First, there is no private information. Strategic delega-
tion plays a similar role, however, because a principal can credibly delegate to a
reluctant agent instead of signaling reluctance by delay, as when there is private
information.Second,thenumberofpartiesisarbitrary.Third,sidepaymentsmay
be necessary to overcome the parties’ participation constraints.4 Fn 4
That principals may enhance their bargaining power by strategic delegation
is well-known in the bargaining literature. Already Schelling (1956) discussed
such delegation, and this has been formalized by Jones (1989) and Segendorff
(1998) in two-player games.5 The present model of delegation draws on Harstad Fn 5
(2007b), where I study how delegation is affected by the majority requirement as
well as the side payments. In this article, consensus is required and the model is
therefore simpler.
2. The Model
There are n principals, N ={ 1,...,n}, and one possible collective project. If
undertaken, its value to principal i ∈ N is vi − θ, where the common shock θ is
uniformly distributed with the mean c and range 2σ:
θ ∼ U[c − σ,c + σ].
Assume that all vi ∈ (c − σ,c + σ), such that the project may or may not
be beneﬁcial. The vi are common knowledge and, because they differ, it may be
necessary with some transfers between the parties. Letting si ∈ R be the transfer
to party i, the principal’s utility from the policy is
ui = vi − θ + si,i ∈ N.
These transfers can be interpreted as a reallocation of the costs associated with
the project. A uniform distribution of costs implies zero side transfers. For any







Variables without subscripts denote the average.
4. In Harstad (2007a), the participation constraints never bind, but policy differentiation can be
beneﬁcial because the value of public good provision differs across districts.
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In the ﬁrst stage, let principal i ∈ N be able to strategically delegate to some
agent that has a di ∈ R higher (or −di lower) value of the project, relative to his
principal. Delegate i’s payoff, if the project is undertaken, is common knowledge
and given by ui +di. Thus, the side payment to party i beneﬁts both the principal
and her agent. This is reasonable in political contexts, for example, where the
agent is a citizen of the district he represents and a larger transfer beneﬁts the
entire district.6 Fn 6
In the second stage, the common shock θ is realized and observed by every-
one.Finally,theagentsnegotiatewhethertoundertaketheprojectandthetransfers
between them. All agents must agree to the policy, and I let the outcome be char-
acterized by the Nash bargaining solution. If the agents do not agree, everyone
receives a utility of zero.
3. Cooperation, Side Payments, and Delegation
3.1. Collective Action without Side Payments
Suppose that side transfers are not feasible. Then, si = 0 for all i ∈ N, and
the bargaining game becomes very simple. The project is undertaken if and only
if all agents beneﬁt from it. This requires that θ ∈[ c − σ,θ0], where θ0 ≡





















shouldbepivotal,anyagentwithbiasdi > 0(di < 0)wouldaccept(respectively,
reject) projects that would hurt (beneﬁt) his principal. There is no strategic value
of delegation, and principal i is better off being represented by an agent with the
same preference as herself. That is, delegation is “sincere.”
Proposition 1. Without side payments, di = 0 for all i ∈ N, and the project is
undertaken if θ ≤ θ0 = v , where v ≡ mini∈N vi.
6. I do not allow for action- or outcome-contingent transfers from the principal to her agent. If that
were possible, inefﬁciency may nevertheless arise (Prat and Rustichini 2003; Jackson and Wilkie
2005), although unobservable contracts could make delegation ineffective (Katz 1991; Fershtman
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Unfortunately, the project is undertaken too seldom. No matter how large is
the average value v ≡

i vi/n, the collective project will not be undertaken if
just one vi is less than θ.
3.2. Side Payments and Strategic Delegation
Ifsidepaymentsareavailable,theagentswillnegotiatetheamountoftransfersas
wellaswhethertodotheproject.Theycanthussolvethestalematejustmentioned,
but there may also be transfers between agents that all beneﬁt from the project.
Using the Nash bargaining solution, the agents end up with identical utility levels
compared to their payoffs in the status quo:7 Fn 7
vi + di + si − θ = v + d − θ,
and therefore
si = v + d − (vi + di).
With these transfers, all the agents prefer to undertake the project if and only if
v + d − θ ≥ 0, or equivalently
θ ≤ θs ≡ v + d. (1)
If this condition holds, agent i approves the project even if vi + di is small,
because the side payment is then accordingly higher. Intuitively, a reluctant agent
has large bargaining power and is able to extract transfers from the other agents.
Similarly, a representative with a very large value of the project is forced, in equi-
librium, to compensate those who beneﬁt less. Anticipating this at the delegation
stage, principal i realizes that she will pay less, or get paid more, by appointing
a reluctant agent, such that di < 0. In equilibrium, therefore, di is going to be
negative.
Proposition 2. With side payments, each principal delegates according to
di =− (1 − 1/n)(v − c + σ)<0 ∀i ∈ N, (2)
and the project is undertaken if and only if θ ≤ θs, where
θs = v/n+ (1 − 1/n)(c − σ)<v . (3)
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(1/n− 1)dθ − di/n = (1/n− 1)(v + d − c + σ)− di/n = 0,
and therefore
di = d =− (1 − 1/n)(v − c + σ).
Substituting into expression (1) gives equation (3).
In order to receive transfers from the other, each principal delegates to a
reluctantagent.Becausereluctantagentsdonotvaluetheprojectasmuchastheir
principals, the project is too seldom implemented. This is exactly the drawback
of appointing a reluctant agent: if θ ∈ (v + d,v + d − di/n), the agents reject
the project and principal i receives zero, even though she would have received a
positive utility, v+

j =i dj/n−θ, by delegating sincerely. However, ifθ is very
uncertain, such that σ is large, then θ is unlikely to fall exactly in this interval.
Moreover, if n is large, i’s agent is in any case unlikely to be pivotal (making this
interval smaller). And, if v is large and c is small, then most likely the project will
be implemented even by the reluctant delegates. Consequently, i delegates to a
very reluctant agent (by reducing di)i fn, σ, and v are large and c is small. Notice
that all delegates have the same bias relative to their principals: di = d∀i ∈ N,
di depends on v but not vi.
3.3. Do Side Payments Help?
Whether side payments are available or not, the project is too seldom imple-
mented. Because this is the only inefﬁciency in the model, side payments are
good if projects are more often accepted if side payments are allowed than if they
are not. This requires θs >θ 0, which immediately gives the following result.
Proposition 3. Side payments are good if and only if
v − v >( v− c + σ)(1 − 1/n). (4)
On the one hand, side payments are good because they allow the winners to
compensatethelosers.Thisislikelytobenecessaryiftheheterogeneityinvalues,
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agents that are negative towards the project. Strategic delegation is particularly
severe if σ and v are large, and c is small. In these circumstances, side payments
do more harm than good, exactly as Proposition 3 states.




when n is large, because the principals then delegate to more reluctant agents.
Thisisthereasonforwhynappearsinequation(4),suggestingthatsidepayments
are less attractive when the number of parties is large.
This result is in sharp contrast to the intuition that side payments should be
more necessary when n is large, because the project is rejected as soon there is
one single loser. To capture this intuition, v should decrease in n. The larger the
number of parties, the smaller the minimum value is likely to be. In other words,
the heterogeneity v − v should increase in n.
Exactly how v decreases in n is not obvious. If the new members of N are
quite similar to the existing members, v −v may not increase much in n, making
equation (4) less likely to hold as n grows. But if the “new” members of N are
likelytobeverydifferentfromtheoldmembers,v−v mayincreasegreatlywhen
n grows. This makes expression (4) more likely to hold and side payments are
then good. This is the case, for example, if the heterogeneity v−v is proportional
to n.
The average value V may also be a function of n. If the new members of N
are likely to have high values of the project, v increases in n and side payments
become bad. If, instead, the new members have low values of the project, side
payments become beneﬁcial when n increases.
Corollary 1. When n increases, side payments become more beneﬁcial if
the new members’ vi are different from or smaller than those of the existing
members. Conversely, side payments become less beneﬁcial if the new members’
vi are similar to or larger than those of the existing members.





are random. Because we already have an aggregate shock in the model, simply
let another shock ε, realized at the same time, determine the individual values
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case of side payments and, for the case without, only the minimal vi matters.
Therefore, suppose that v is affected by the shock ε in a very simple way:
v = v − ε, where ε ∼ U(0, ¯ ε). (5)
For n = 2,ε can be interpreted as ε =| ε|, where ε ∼ U(−¯ ε, ¯ ε)and ε simply
increases 1’s value while simultaneously reducing 2’s value by the same amount,
thus keeping v ﬁxed: If v1 = v + ε and v2 = v − ε,min {v1,v 2}=v −| ε|.
The larger is ¯ ε, the larger is the potential heterogeneity. Intuitively, side pay-
mentsshouldbebeneﬁcialif ¯ εislarge,whereasthecomparativestaticwithrespect
totheotherparametersmaybeasbefore.Thisintuitioniscorrect,andtheprevious
result is unchanged if we just replace v − v by ¯ ε/
√
3.
Proposition 4. Assuming deﬁnition (5), side payments are good if and only if
¯ ε/
√
3 >( v− c + σ)(1 − 1/n). (6)











=[ (v − c + σ)2 −¯ ε2/3]/4σ.
With side payments, on the other hand, ε does not affect θs, and ε’s distribution








(v − c + σ)2(2n − 1)
4σn
.
Comparing u0 and us concludes the proof.
5. Conclusion
Do side payments make collective action more likely? The common presumption
is “yes”: by allowing transfers, winners can compensate the losers and any agree-
ment that increases total utility can be implemented as a Pareto improvement.
However, this article shows that, with side payments on the agenda, principals
delegatetomorereluctantagentstogainbargainingpower.Morereluctantagents
are, in turn, less likely to approve good collective projects. Side payments make
collectiveactionlesslikelyifthevalueofcooperationisquiteuncertainbutlikely
tobelarge,andtheheterogeneityissmall.Ifthenumberofpartiesincreases,coop-
eration is more likely to fail if transfers are not feasible, but if they are feasible,
principals delegate to more reluctant agents. Therefore, it is not clear whether
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The model is directly applicable to multiple projects: It does not need to be
binary.Bylettingtherandomcostθ measureadeterministiccostofoneparticular
project,cooperationtakesplaceforthesetofprojectswherethecostθ islessthan




evant in economics. Also in politics, these questions are very important. Side
payments may be facilitated by linking different political issues, or by allocat-
ing authority to the heads of governments, instead of more specialized ministers.
Typically,economistsadvocatesuchlinkagesandtransfers,becausethenCoasian
bargaining may lead to efﬁciency. It is thus puzzling why side transfers, partic-
ularly explicit payments, often are absent from international agreements. This
article contributes to explaining this puzzle, and it points to circumstances where,
and reasons for why, side payments may be bad.
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